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INTRODUCTION
The past generation will surely be seen as a golden era in American
bankruptcy law.
Prior to the enactment of the Code in 1978, bankruptcy practice was
reputed to be a little sketchy.1 There were frequent concerns about the
influence of bankruptcy “rings” in the major cities—groups that treated
bankruptcy cases as a source of patronage opportunities that they shared
among themselves.2 The once glamorous large scale corporate
reorganization practice had fallen on hard times, dwindling in importance
and prestige.3 Law schools responded to these reputational issues by
disguising the content of their bankruptcy classes with labels like
Debtors’ and Creditors’ Rights or Commercial Credit I & II.4

† S. Samuel Arsht Professor, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School. I am
grateful to Vincent Buccola, Anthony Casey, Bruce Grohsgal, James Sprayregen, and George
Triantis for helpful comments, to Jinlin Ye for excellent research assistance, and to the
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School for generous summer funding.
1. DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEMS, PROCESS, REFORM
(Brookings Inst., 1971).
2. An influential study of bankruptcy practice in the 1960s (published in 1971)
complained that “it is not difficult for creditors’ attorneys to arrange elections among
themselves,” thus determining who would serve as trustee and hire a favored attorney as
counsel. Id. at 78.
3. See, e.g., Profiting from the Failures of Others, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 2, 1990, at 1, 29
(reporting that “before large corporate clients began to use the 1978 Bankruptcy Code as a
way out of short-term financial problems, most large firms ignored the field altogether”).
4. At the University of Pennsylvania, where I teach, the bankruptcy class was called
Commercial Credit II until Fall 2010.
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This all changed after the 1978 Code was enacted. The Code took
aim at concerns about bankruptcy rings by, among other things, sharply
separating the administrative and judicial functions in a bankruptcy case
and limiting the judge to judicial responsibilities.5 The Code also
completely reworked the Code’s corporate reorganization provisions,
making it much more user friendly for businesses in financial distress. 6
Within a few years, bankruptcy had an entirely different vibe. Although
Chapter 11, the principal focus of this Essay, was vigorously debated in
the scholarly literature in the early 1990s,7 those doubts, as important as
they seemed to law professors, never troubled bankruptcy professionals
in any serious way. And in time, even most law professors tended to
conclude that Chapter 11 worked pretty well. 8 Lawmakers in other
countries have been sufficiently impressed by Chapter 11 that many have
incorporated features of Chapter 11 into their own insolvency laws.9
As his essay for this volume reflects, Sam Gerdano was in the
middle of these developments almost from the very beginning. 10 After an
initial exposure to bankruptcy issues in the New York attorney general’s
office, he worked for Senator Grassley, a key lawmaker on the Judiciary
Committee, for a number of years before accepting a position as the
executive director of the American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) in 1991.11
Over nearly thirty years, he transformed the ABI from a small
organization that didn’t have a clear niche, to an essential partner to the
American bankruptcy system, and a key resource for insolvency
professionals and others.12
To put the ABI in context, it is worth comparing it to the other two
most important bankruptcy organizations. The oldest, the National
Bankruptcy Conference, is an elite group of roughly sixty bankruptcy
lawyers, judges, and professors that serves as a nonprofit lobbying

5. See D.J. BAKER ET AL., COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11: 2012–
2014 FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, AM. BANKR. INST. 28 (2014); see also Charles
J. Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5,
35 (1995).
6. See Tabb, supra note 5, at 35.
7. See Charles J. Tabb, The Future of Chapter 11, 44 S.C. L. REV. 791, 792 (1993)
(discussing scholarly criticism of Chapter 11).
8. See BAKER, supra note 5, at 11.
9. Id. at 8 n.7; see Nathalie Martin, The Role of History and Culture in Developing
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Systems: The Perils of Legal Transplantation, 28 B.C. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005).
10. See Samuel J. Gerdano, An Oral History: Reflections on My 35 Years in Bankruptcy
Policy, 71 SYRACUSE L. REV. 424, 423–26 (2021).
11. Id. at 424–26, 430.
12. Id. at 430–41.
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organization on behalf of its members’ vision of bankruptcy law.13 The
American College of Bankruptcy—of which Sam is a member—is an
honor society for the profession.14
The ABI is the organization for everyone in the bankruptcy world,
and a source of information for those outside. 15 It remains carefully
neutral, and provides information for lawmakers, sources for reporters,
conferences and panel to discuss ideas, and much more.16 One of the
signature events in Sam’s tenure was an extensive study of the
bankruptcy system that produced by far the most important recent study
of bankruptcy.17 The ABI enlisted numerous bankruptcy professionals,
and the report was overseen by a commission that limited its
recommendations to those that received supermajority support.18
I first met Sam over two decades ago, and since then have come to
expect to see his smiling face whenever bankruptcy issues are in the air—
not just at ABI events but elsewhere as well. Fifteen years ago, he invited
me to serve as scholar in residence for a semester at the ABI. It is hard to
imagine a more pleasant way to spend a semester. I took the train down
each week, spent a few days at ABI headquarters in Alexandria, and
immersed myself in ABI activities. Suddenly newspaper reporters wanted
to talk to me, and I had no trouble persuading bankruptcy luminaries to
be interviewed for the ABI’s oral history project. I also saw the enormous
planning that goes into ABI events, and the efficiency and breadth of the
organization.
Looking back over Sam’s career, it is as if he took stock in the
Bankruptcy Code back in the very beginning. But he didn’t just sit back
and watch American bankruptcy law flourish. To the contrary, he has
done more than almost anyone else to make it thrive and to ensure that its
success continues. During the current coronavirus crisis, which has led to

13. See About Us, NAT’L BANKR. CONFERENCE (last visited Nov. 22, 2020),
http://www.nbconf.org/about-us/. The National Bankruptcy Conference has close ties to the
Judiciary Committees in the House and Senate, which handle bankruptcy issues. See id.
(“[T]he NBC offers members of Congress, Congressional Committees, and their staffs the
services of its Conferees as non-partisan technical advisors.”).
14. See About, AM. COLL. OF BANKR. (last visited Mar. 2, 2021),
https://www.americancollegeofbankruptcy.com/about/.
15. See About Us, AM. BANKR. INST. (last visited Mar. 2, 2021),
https://www.abi.org/about-us.
16. See Gerdano, supra note 10, at 431 (noting the neutrality policy).
17. See generally BAKER, supra note 5 (evaluating U.S. business reorganization laws and
outlining recommendations to improve the Bankruptcy Code).
18. See id. at 17–18 (stating that a recommendation was not approved unless two-thirds
of the commissioners voting supported it).
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a substantial increase in business bankruptcy filings, the resources and
education that the ABI provides have been more important than ever.19
One of Sam’s most remarkable qualities, in my view, is that he rarely
seems to try to take credit for any of this. He didn’t give long speeches at
the beginning of ABI events or make sure his name was splashed all over
the written materials. He quietly went about the business of doing what
needed to be done.
Sam’s retirement is an opportune time to assess where Chapter 11
stands after more than four decades with the same basic framework in
place. Perhaps not surprisingly, the assessment I offer in this Essay will
quickly take a theoretical turn—I will focus not just on bankruptcy
practice, but even more on the current state of bankruptcy theory—since,
as a law professor, that is what I do.
The standard theory of bankruptcy for the past generation has been
the Creditors’ Bargain Theory devised by Thomas Jackson, individually
and in co-authored work with Douglas Baird.20 The Creditors’ Bargain
Theory explains bankruptcy as a solution to coordination problems that
might lead to the dismemberment of an otherwise viable firm if creditors
were simply left to their own devices.21 The role of bankruptcy, according
to the theory, is to provide a collective forum for resolving these problems
and to facilitate an efficient resolution of financial distress.
When the Creditors’ Bargain Theory was developed, shortly after
the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, the Code was thought to be a
framework of mandatory rules.22 Jackson characterized it, and
bankruptcy law generally, as solving a bargaining failure by
19. While drafting an essay on the bankruptcy implications of the current crisis, I
immediately thought of the ABI as the one private organization that could help expand the
capacity of the bankruptcy system if needed. See DAVID SKEEL, Bankruptcy and the
Coronavirus, ECON. STUD. AT BROOKINGS 11 (Apr. 2020) (“Private organizations such as the
American Bankruptcy Institute could assist by providing nationwide training for nonbankruptcy lawyers who are likely to be working on bankruptcy cases in the coming
months.”).
20. Thomas H. Jackson introduced the Creditors’ Bargain theory in Bankruptcy, NonBankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 858 (1982). He and
Douglas Baird subsequently developed the theory in other articles and a book. E.g., THOMAS
H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 7 (Harvard Univ. Press 1986)
[hereinafter LOGIC AND LIMITS]; Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate
Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate
Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 100–01 (1984). Jackson
recounts the origins of the Creditors’ Bargain theory in a recent essay. See Thomas H. Jackson,
A Retrospective Look at Bankruptcy’s New Frontiers, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1867, 1867–68
(2018).
21. See David A. Skeel, Jr. & George Triantis, Bankruptcy’s Uneasy Shift to a Contract
Paradigm, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1777, 1778 (2018).
22. See id. at 1780.
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implementing—through a “hypothetical bargain”—rules the parties
would have agreed to if negotiation were possible. 23
The most distinctive feature of current Chapter 11 practice is the
extent to which the parties now enter into actual contracts governing their
rights and responsibilities.24 Intercreditor agreements allocate authority
between senior and junior lien creditors, restructuring support agreements
commit the parties to the terms of an expected reorganization plan, and
debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing agreements dictate the course of
many bankruptcy cases.25 Building on a recent article with George
Triantis, I call these developments the new contract paradigm. 26
One question raised by the dramatic shift in bankruptcy practice is
whether the Creditors’ Bargain Theory is now largely irrelevant or even
obsolete, as some scholars have suggested.27 It is true, as Triantis and I
and others have noted, that the particular coordination problem
foregrounded by Baird and Jackson—the collective action problem faced
by widely scattered unsecured creditors—no longer characterizes most
Chapter 11 cases.28 But this bargaining problem has been replaced by
other bargaining failures—such as bilateral monopolies between the
debtor and a key creditor, or between two creditors—to which the same
logic applies.29
I do not mean to suggest the Creditors’ Bargain Theory explains all
of bankruptcy. It doesn’t. The theory provides a much more complete
picture of why bankruptcy is necessary, than of the optimal framework
for resolving financial distress. This is not surprising, given that there
does not appear to be a single, optimal resolution strategy. In current
practice, the key question is how to make sense of the contracts that now
govern the Chapter 11 process. I argue that the principal objective should
be to distinguish between ex ante and ex post agreements, and to seek to
balance the costs and benefits of each. Perhaps because Chapter 11 is
itself designed to facilitate an ex post agreement, bankruptcy judges have
23. See, e.g., LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 20, at 16–17.
24. See Skeel & Triantis, supra note 21, at 1779.
25. See id. at 1780.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Vincent S.J. Buccola, Bankruptcy’s Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Distress, 114 NW. U.L. REV. 705, 707 (2019); Anthony J. Casey, Chapter 11’s
Renegotiation Framework and the Purpose of Corporate Bankruptcy, 120 COLUM. L. REV.
1709, 1709 (2020). Professors Buccola and Casey take their critiques in starkly different
directions, with Buccola advocating a minimalist bankruptcy framework and Casey a
maximalist one.
28. See, e.g. Skeel & Triantis, supra note 21, at 1779–80.
29. Vince Buccola is the scholar who has focused most directly on the bilateral monopoly
issue. Buccola, supra note 27, at 724–25.
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been much more accommodating to ex post agreements than to ex ante
agreements.30 This approach is, in my view, too hostile to ex ante
contracts and does not provide sufficient scrutiny of ex post agreements.
In Part I of the Essay, I develop the theoretical analysis just
described. Along the way, I comment on some of the important current
bankruptcy contracts, including intercreditor agreements and
restructuring support agreements. In Part II, I apply the insights of Part I
to two types of ex post agreement that have become increasingly
controversial, DIP financing agreements and managerial bonuses.
I. THE NEW CONTRACT PARADIGM
The most remarkable bankruptcy development of the opening
decades of the twenty-first century is the pervasiveness of contracts in
Chapter 11—some entered into before financial distress and some entered
into in anticipation of bankruptcy or during the case.31 In this part, I
identify and assess the contract paradigm that has emerged. To set the
stage, I first consider whether these developments have rendered the
reigning normative theory of bankruptcy—the Creditors’ Bargain
theory—obsolete. I then turn to the current contract paradigm itself.
A. Demise of the Creditor’s Bargain Theory?
For the past generation, the Creditors’ Bargain Theory has been the
preeminent normative theory of bankruptcy.32 According to this theory,
the principal role of corporate bankruptcy is to solve a coordination
problem.33 If a debtor’s creditors are left to their own devices, it is
individually rational for each to race to the courthouse, rushing to collect
what it is owed, even though these collection efforts may lead to the
dismemberment of otherwise viable firms, thus destroying social value.34
Bankruptcy solves this bargaining failure by creating a collective forum
for the resolution of financial distress.35 Bankruptcy law should focus on
this essential goal, according to the Creditors’ Bargain theory, but should
not otherwise alter nonbankruptcy law, lest it invite costly squabbles
between those that will be better off in bankruptcy and those who will do
better if the debtor stays out of bankruptcy. 36 The deference to
30. See Skeel & Triantis, supra note 21, at 1781.
31. See id. at 1779.
32. See id. at 1778.
33. See LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 20, at 7.
34. See id. at 16.
35. See id at 20.
36. See, e.g. id. at 21 (“[T]he establishment of new entitlements in bankruptcy . . .
create[s] incentives for particular holders of rights in assets to resort to bankruptcy . . . to gain
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nonbankruptcy law is sometimes called the Butner Principle—a reference
to the Supreme Court case it was inspired by. 37
The Creditors’ Bargain Theory was hotly contested from the
beginning, most famously in a 1987 debate between Douglas Baird and
Elizabeth Warren in the pages of the University of Chicago Law Review.38
After the early 1990s, however, the Creditors’ Bargain Theory seemed to
attract less commentary. This was perhaps due in part to the vagaries of
scholarly attention, which turned in the 1990s to debates over whether
Chapter 11 should be replaced by an alternative conception. 39 But it also
seems to have reflected changes in the capital structure of Chapter 11
debtors. Even the largest frequently were fully encumbered when they
entered Chapter 11, with little value likely to be available for unsecured
claims.40 The particular bargaining failure foregrounded by Jackson—the
collective action problem faced by scattered unsecured creditors—is no
longer as common as it once was.
One possible conclusion, given the sweeping changes in Chapter 11
practice, might be that the time has come to jettison the Creditors’
Bargain Theory. Some scholars who share the law and economics lineage
for themselves the advantages of those changes, even when a bankruptcy proceeding would
not be in the collective interest of the investor group.”). Jackson derived this principle from
the Supreme Court decision in Butner v. United States: “Uniform treatment of property
interests by both state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to
discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving ‘a windfall merely by
reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.’” 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (quoting Lewis v. Mfrs.
Nat’l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)).
37. See, e.g., Kenneth M. Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Law as a Liquidity
Provider, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1557, 1564–65 (2013) (using the term “Normative Butner
Principle”).
38. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 776–77 (1987)
(contending that the purpose of bankruptcy law is “to reckon with a debtor’s multiple defaults
and to distribute the consequences among a number of different actors”); Douglas G. Baird,
Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 822 (1987)
(arguing that “[w]henever we must have a legal rule to distribute losses in bankruptcy, we
must also have a legal rule that distributes the same loss outside of bankruptcy,” and “that
these two rules [should] be the same”).
39. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 323 (1993) (advocating use of “chameleon equity”);
Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Reorganization, 71
TEX. L. REV. 51, 68 (1992) (advocating use of a “menu approach”). Thomas Jackson also had
exited the scene, serving as law dean and provost at University of Virginia, then president at
the University of Rochester. See Our History: Former Faculty: Jackson, Thomas H. (1988–
1994),
UNIV.
VA.
(last
updated
Oct.
22,
2020,
5:43
PM),
https://libguides.law.virginia.edu/faculty/jackon.
40. Even if the firm does have significant unsecured debt, unsecured creditors are less
likely to be fragmented and dispersed than in the past. See, e.g., Buccola, supra note 27, at
716–17.
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that spawned the Creditors’ Bargain Theory have indeed questioned its
continuing relevance.41 According to the most aggressive recent critique,
which questions whether the theory was ever compelling and aims to kill
the giant, “the model of an ex ante agreement among creditors [to provide
a collective forum for resolving financial distress] proves both
unnecessary and unhelpful in defining the substance and scope” of
bankruptcy.42 Similarly, the admonition to honor nonbankruptcy rules
unless necessary to achieve a bankruptcy objective, as called for by the
Butner Principle, “is both circular and wrong.43 It is circular—or at least
self-contradicting—because it relies on nonbankruptcy entitlements to
tell us when the law should interfere with nonbankruptcy entitlements.”44
Another scholar does not explicitly reject the Creditors’ Bargain Theory
but suggests its relevance has receded. 45 He frames his inquiry as asking
what features of Chapter 11 remain necessary.46
The Creditors’ Bargain Theory unquestionably is an incomplete
account of bankruptcy. I will say more about this in a moment. But first
let me explain why the new round of critiques is not likely to slay the
giant. One limitation of the recent challenges is that they are often unfair
to the theory itself. It is not altogether accurate, for instance, to say that
the Creditors’ Bargain Theory is circular, because “it relies on
nonbankruptcy entitlements to tell us when the law should interfere with
nonbankruptcy entitlements.”47 The Creditors’ Bargain Theory justifies
bankruptcy as providing a collective forum for resolving financial
distress, and thus starts with the claim that the provisions needed to
achieve this objective—such as the automatic stay, a preference

41. See generally Buccola, supra note 27 (arguing that key features of Chapter 11 such
as the automatic stay are no longer needed due to changes in credit markets); see generally
Casey, supra note 27 (rejecting the Creditors’ Bargain Theory and advocating a focus on ex
post holdup issues). Scholars from the progressive tradition exemplified by Elizabeth Warren
never embraced the Creditors’ Bargain Theory. See Warren, supra note 38, at 776–77. The
recent criticism by law and economics scholars is thus more striking. See Casey, supra note
27, at 1714.
42. Casey, supra note 27, at 1725.
43. Id. at 1728.
44. Id. Juliet Moringiello seems to have been the first recent scholar to point out the
ambiguity in the Butner Principle. See Juliet Moringiello, When Does Some Federal Interest
Require a Different Result?: An Essay on the Use and Misuse of Butner v. United States, 2015
U. ILL. L. REV. 657, 658 (2015). Versions of this critique also were directed at the Creditors’
Bargain Model during the earlier debate. See, e.g., David Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy
85 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1342 (1987) (reviewing LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 20 contending
that the details of nonbankruptcy law are indeterminate in many respects).
45. Buccola, supra note 27, at 715.
46. Id. at 720–21.
47. Casey, supra note 27, at 1728.
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provision, and the rules for executory contracts 48—should override any
inconsistent nonbankruptcy law.49 The Butner Principle is an implication
of the theory’s contention that bankruptcy should not do more than this—
it should not be used to address nonbankruptcy problems.
Second, the core insight of the Creditors’ Bargain Theory—that a
collective forum is needed to address the bargaining failures that will
otherwise occur in the event of financial distress—is as compelling a
justification for bankruptcy as it was forty years ago. In current cases,
coordination problems among scattered unsecured creditors often are not
a serious problem, but other bargaining failures threaten to prevent an
efficient resolution of the debtor’s financial distress. Today’s bargaining
failures often are created or exacerbated by the parties’ contracts. The
complex combination of intercreditor and agreement among lenders
provisions in the RadioShack case is a vivid illustration. 50 The
sophisticated parties in that case created what was, in effect, a synthetic
collective action problem. In other cases, the potential bargaining failures
are simpler, but also could not be effectively resolved without a
bankruptcy forum.51
It also is telling that features of the Creditors’ Bargain theory
frequently slip back into the accounts of its critics. The vigorous critique
cited earlier dismisses the importance of the bargaining failures described
by the Creditors’ Bargain Theory, yet later states that: “[t]he automatic
stay is one of bankruptcy’s central provisions. It directly addresses the
classic ‘collective action problem.’”52 The critique also acknowledges
bankruptcy is needed to assure that these and other bargaining failures do
not destroy a distressed firm’s going concern value.53 After describing the
Butner Principle as “both circular and wrong,” the critique later
concludes that “a soft version of Butner” should be applied, 54 and that

48. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a), 547(b), 365(a) (2021) (automatic stay, preferences, and
executory contracts, respectively).
49. Buccola, supra note 27, at 706, 711, 712, 721.
50. Salus Capital Partners, LLC v. Std. Wireless Inc. (In re RadioShack Corp.), 550 B.R.
700, 703 (Bankr. D. Del. 2016). RadioShack had two major groups of secured lenders, with
an agreement between the two groups and separate agreements within each group. See id. For
an overview of the case, see Kenneth Ayotte, Anthony J. Casey, & David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Bankruptcy on the Side, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 255, 269–72 (2017).
51. See, e.g., Buccola, supra note 27, at 724–25 (describing bilateral monopolies that can
interfere with efficient resolution of financial distress and characterizing bankruptcy as
“toggling” from property rights to liability rules to resolve these potential bargaining failures).
52. Casey, supra note 27, at 1755.
53. Id. at 1734 n.108 (focusing on the need to protect “relationship-specific investments”
but defining them in terms of going concern value).
54. Id. at 1751.
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“bankruptcy law is limited in scope and should [only] address bankruptcy
matters.”55
Perhaps a bankruptcy equivalent of quantum theory will come along
and reorient everyone’s thinking. But it strikes me as more likely that the
Creditors’ Bargain theory will endure.
B. The Limits of the Theory
I do not mean to suggest that the Creditors’ Bargain Theory is a
complete theory of bankruptcy. It isn’t. The theory provides a compelling
explanation of why business bankruptcy is needed and of the importance
of protecting non-bankruptcy entitlements except where deviation is
required to create a collective forum for resolving financial distress. The
theory has much less to say about the details of the resolution process.
One missing piece is liquidity. The debtor’s operations need to be
funded during the bankruptcy process, but a distressed firm is likely to
face serious obstacles to borrowing, even if it has profitable business
opportunities, due to debt overhang and asymmetric information
problems.56 Chapter 11 counteracts this problem, and generates liquidity,
in a variety of ways. The most obvious is its provision for DIP
financing.57 Other sources of liquidity include the automatic stay, the
treatment of proceeds of collateral, and the provision that permits
bankruptcy sales.58
The theory also provides only limited insight into governance and
resolution.59 Any bankruptcy framework needs to make choices about
how the business will be governed during bankruptcy and how its distress
is to be resolved. According to the Creditors’ Bargain Theory, the distress
should be resolved the way it would be resolved if there were a single
owner of the business.60 The single owner perspective is helpful but
provides only limited insight how to get there. 61

55. Id. at 1747.
56. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 37, 1562. Buccola suggests that the Ayotte & Skeel
analysis “expanded” the Creditors’ Bargain Theory. Buccola, supra note 26, at 712.
57. See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2021). George Triantis was the first to recognize the importance
of this provision as a solution to debt overhang. See George G. Triantis, A Theory of the
Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing, 46 VAND. L. REV. 901, 919, 920, 925 (1993).
58. See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 37, at 1565, 1623; George G. Triantis, Financial Slack
Policy and the Laws of Secured Transactions, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 35, 66 (2000).
59. I say “limited” rather than “no” insight because Baird and Jackson had more to say
about governance and resolution than about liquidity. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note
20, at 100.
60. See Casey, supra note 27, at 1731.
61. As Professor Casey points out, correctly in my view. See id.
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In my view, there are multiple ways that a bankruptcy system can
encourage efficient governance and resolution by, among other things,
reducing potential agency costs.62 The approach taken in Chapter 11
begins with the drafters’ decisions to permit the managers of a debtor to
continue running the business as DIP after it files for bankruptcy, 63 and
to give the managers an “exclusivity period” during which they are the
only ones who can file a reorganization plan. 64 These provisions are in
many respects the “secret sauce” of Chapter 11, the provisions that
distinguished it from any other country’s insolvency rules for many
years.65 Because the debtor’s managers are not immediately displaced at
the outset of a bankruptcy case, they are less likely to delay filing for
bankruptcy.66 The managers are not given free rein in bankruptcy,
however. They are subject to extensive oversight, and any actions outside
the ordinary court of business must be approved by the court after full
disclosure and an opportunity for other parties to object. 67 The other key
feature of Chapter 11 is its waivable absolute priority rule.68 The overall
framework is designed to facilitate the reorganization of a debtor’s
obligations (and to nudge them in this direction). 69
One can imagine courts fully protecting these governance choices
by prohibiting contractual efforts to alter them. A court might invalidate
contracts that have the effect of diminishing the debtors’ managers’
flexibility in proposing a reorganization plan. But that is not what
bankruptcy judges have done. For the past several decades, lenders have
used DIP financing agreements to, among other things, require that
debtors conduct a sale of their assets or propose a reorganization plan
62. I discuss two very different strategies for achieving these objectives—the more
reorganization-oriented U.S. approach and an approach that tends toward liquidation if
insolvency proceedings are initiated—at length in earlier work. See generally John Armour,
Brian R. Cheffins & David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution
of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1699 (2002); David
A. Skeel, Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1325 (1998) (both discussing different approaches to corporate bankruptcy).
63. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2021).
64. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (2021).
65. For a helpful discussion of the recent adoption of Chapter 11-like bankruptcy rules in
many countries, see James H.M. Sprayregen, International Insolvency: From Punitive
Regimes Toward Rescue Culture, 36 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 7 (2020).
66. See id.
67. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2021).
68. The absolute priority rule, which prohibits lower priority creditors or shareholders
from receiving a recovery unless higher priority creditors will be paid in full, only applies to
classes that object to a proposed reorganization plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2021).
69. It also is designed to shift decision-making authority from shareholders to the residual
class of creditors. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1519,
1557 (2004).
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within a restricted period of time. 70 Contractual arrangements have also
been used to reshape many of the other features of bankruptcy.71
The ubiquity of contract in current Chapter 11 raises the questions I
will focus on for much of the remainder of this Essay: how are the
contracts being regulated, and how should they be regulated?
C. The Contours of the New Contract Paradigm
Contract theory suggests that the best starting point for thinking
about the role of contract in bankruptcy is to distinguish between ex ante
contracts—contracts entered into before the onset of financial distress—
and agreements that parties reach ex post.72 Each has important costs and
benefits. A signal benefit of an ex ante agreement is that, because it
allocates risks between the parties, it invites each to invest in the
relationship.73 If the parties know the contract may later be subject to
renegotiation, the allocation of risk and their incentive to invest in the
relationship may be undermined. 74 Given the importance of these
benefits, the parties sometimes take steps to make the contract more
difficult to renegotiate.75 The classic scholarly account posits that a
borrower can minimize its incentive to default and renegotiate a contract
by borrowing from multiple creditors.76
An important downside of ex ante contracts is that the parties have
limited information when they enter into the contract, and they are
unlikely to be able to fully anticipate all of the issues that may arise in the
future.77 The parties can hedge to some extent by including flexible
70. Early articles exploring this development include Douglas G. Baird & Robert K.
Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 785–85 (2002); David A. Skeel,
Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 917, 919 (2003).
71. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Distorted Choice in Corporate Bankruptcy, 130 YALE
L.J. 366, 371–73 (2020) (describing how restructuring support agreements and deathtrap
provisions alter Chapter 11’s disclosure and voting rules).
72. The discussion in this section draws on and extends the analysis in Skeel & Triantis,
supra note 21, at 1779.
73. See id. at 1782; see also Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts
and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 192–94 (2005) (discussing
the tension between ex ante and ex post contracting, and the related tension between
commitment and flexibility).
74. See Skeel & Triantis, supra note 21, at 1782.
75. See id. at 1783.
76. See Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein, Optimal Debt Structure and the Number
of Creditors, 104 J. POL. ECON. 1, 20 (1996).
77. See Skeel & Triantis, supra note 21, at 1790. Another important downside is the
possibility that an ex ante contract can be used to expropriate value from third parties. See
Ayotte et al, supra note 50, at 260. For discussion of this risk with intercreditor agreements,
and a possible response, see id. at 263.
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standards in their agreement, but vague provisions can reduce the benefits
of the contract by increasing uncertainty and the risk of subsequent
litigation.78 Ex post contracts are not subject to these constraints. Because
the future state of the world has already materialized when the parties
negotiate the terms of an ex post contract, ex post contracting takes place
in an information rich environment. The parties have much less
uncertainty than with an ex ante contract.
It is tempting to imagine a contract that achieves the benefits of both
ex ante and ex post contracting. The parties might negotiate a detailed,
fully specified contract ex ante, with the expectation that they will later
renegotiate the contract to keep it up to date. But such a contract has the
downsides of an ex post contract: the prospect of renegotiation would
destabilize the parties’ allocation of risks and chill the incentive to invest
in the relationship.79 The tradeoff between ex ante and ex post contracts
is unavoidable, and needs to be taken into account in courts’ handling of
contracts in bankruptcy.
There is an odd asymmetry in bankruptcy courts’ current scrutiny of
ex ante and ex post contracts. Courts seem to be much more sympathetic
to the latter than the former.80 The most striking illustration is the
emerging doctrine with respect to two of the most important contracts in
many current cases, intercreditor agreements and restructuring support
agreements.81 Bankruptcy judges have subjected intercreditor
agreements, which allocate the rights of senior and junior secured lenders
ex ante, to intense scrutiny.82 Unless a term that a senior lender wishes to
enforce is “clear beyond peradventure,” courts often refuse to honor it.83
With restructuring support agreements, by contrast, courts have been far
more welcoming.84
The ex post bias is in many respects understandable. Chapter 11
itself has a substantial ex post bias. Its voting rules enable the parties to
restructure obligations that would be more difficult to renegotiate outside
of bankruptcy, and the threat of cramdown or liquidation nudges the
parties toward a consensual restructuring.85 In addition, ex post contracts
78. See Skeel & Triantis, supra note 21, at 1791.
79. See id. at 1782.
80. See id. at 1781.
81. Id. at 1806 (quoting In re Bos. Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. 302, 319 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2010)); see also David Skeel, Unwritten Rules and the New Contract Paradigm, 36 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 739, 743, 747 (2020).
82. See Skeel & Triantis, supra note 21, at 1806–07.
83. Id. at 1806. The “clear beyond peradventure” language was coined in In re Bos.
Generating, LLC, 440 B.R. at 319.
84. See id. at 1808.
85. See id. at 1799–1800.
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tend to facilitate a restructuring or other resolution of the debtor’s
financial distress, whereas ex ante contracts often do not; and ex post
contracts are negotiated by bankruptcy insiders.86 The bias comes with
significant costs, however: courts may not fully police the potential
problems with ex post contracts, and they may undermine the benefits of
the parties’ ex post contracts.
This does not mean that ex ante contracts always should be enforced
as written. Intercreditor agreements between senior and junior lenders are
a good illustration both of the excessive hostility to ex ante agreements
and the need for scrutiny. Bankruptcy courts’ insistence that the terms of
an intercreditor agreement be “clear beyond peradventure” seems
problematic.87 But intercreditor agreements can create externalities that
harm other creditors and undermine the efficiency of the bankruptcy
process.88 It is altogether appropriate to police these externalities by, for
instance, limiting senior creditors to their expectation damages in the
event of a breach.89
The much-discussed bankruptcy of General Growth Properties
(GGP) is a much closer call.90 GGP, a large network of shopping centers,
set up many of the shopping centers in bankruptcy remote entities.91
Despite their bankruptcy remote status, GGP filed bankruptcy petitions
for many of them.92 The bankruptcy court upheld the filings and
permitted GGP to use the entities to fund the bankruptcy case. 93 It is
possible that the extraordinary market conditions of the 2008–2009
financial crisis justified undoing of the parties’ ex ante commitments, but
this seems debatable at best.94 The ruling has the potential to undermine
the benefits of ex ante planning.95

86. See id. at 1781–82; see also Ayotte et al, supra note 50, at 260 (describing the
downsides of intercreditor agreements, such as stalling a value-maximizing sale).
87. See, e.g., Ayotte et al, supra note 50, at 262–63 (arguing that courts’ narrow reading
may prompt the parties to adopt overly broad provisions); see also Bos. Generating, LLC, 440
B.R. at 319.
88. See, e.g., Ayotte et al, supra note 50, at 260–61.
89. See id. at 261.
90. See In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 69 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
91. See id. at 47–48.
92. See id. at 54–55.
93. See id. at 69.
94. Ken Ayotte has offered another possible concern with ex ante arrangements of this
sort. See generally Kenneth Ayotte, Disagreement and Capital Structure Complexity, 49 J.
LEG. STUD. 1, 14 (2020) (suggesting that ex ante agreements sometimes may reflect
inefficiencies arising from the parties’ different views about valuation).
95. For a similar view, see Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey, No Exit? Withdrawal
Rights and the Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29 (2013). For a
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Just as my analysis is not a call to wave off scrutiny of ex ante
contracts altogether, I also do not mean to suggest ex post contracts are
invariably problematic. Restructuring Support Agreements (RSA or Plan
Support Agreements, when they are entered into post-petition) are a good
illustration.96 An RSA commits its signatories to a reorganization plan
that has the features specified in the contract, and often includes a signing
fee for those who sign.97 In my view, these fees, like other features of
RSAs, should be scrutinized, but they are not invariably pernicious. A
signing fees may help counteract strategic holdout behavior, for instance.
Although bankruptcy courts have sometimes approved problematic
RSAs, as in the recent Ad Hoc Committee of Non-Consenting Creditors
v. Peabody Energy Corp. case,98 in my view, they have properly upheld
RSAs with signing fees in others.99
Responding to this perspective, several scholars have recently
contended that my framework for analyzing RSAs is far too
permissive.100 “While he ably examines the tension between the ‘legal’
aspects of the disclosure and voting process contemplated by the statute
and the practicalities of bargaining in the current world of financial
players and financial instruments,” they write in a careful critique, “he
fails to appreciate fully the importance of these “legal” aspects and is
therefore too quick to acquiesce [to provisions that alter them]. 101 These
scholars appear to call for a strong presumption against contractual
provisions that can be seen as altering the traditional disclosure and
voting process in any way, and to contend that RSAs with signing fees
should be prohibited altogether, 102 “even if this puts ultimate
more robust defense of the court’s ex post intervention, see Casey, supra note 27, at 1759–
62.
96. For an extensive analysis of restructuring support agreements and proposed rules of
thumb for scrutinizing them, see Skeel, supra note 81.
97. See id. at 381.
98. See 933 F.3d 918, 923–24 (8th Cir. 2019).
99. In re Indianapolis Downs, LLC, 486 B.R. 286, 32 (Bankr. D. Del. 2013).
100. Edward J. Janger & Adam J. Levitin, The Proceduralist Intervention—A Response to
Skeel, 130 YALE L.J. 335, 338 (2020) [hereinafter, Proceduralist Inversion]; see also Edward
J. Janger & Adam J. Levitin, Badges of Opportunism: Principles for Policing Restructuring
Support Agreements, 13 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 169, 172–73 (2018) [hereinafter,
Badges of Opportunism] (arguing for intense scrutiny of RSAs).
101. See id.; One minor quibble with Ted Janger’s and Adam Levitin’s characterization of
my work in their response: I have never used the term “proceduralist” to describe my work,
preferring the standard term “law-and-economics.” I also have called Elizabeth Warren and
other critics of this perspective “progressives,” not “traditionalists.” See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR.,
DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 200–02 (2001).
102. Proceduralist Inversion, supra note 100, at 346 (noting that “[i]n an earlier article we
took the position that entitlement-distorting RSAs ought to be proscribed,” and subsequently
stating that this response is intended “not only to defend our position, but to flesh it out”);
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confirmation at risk.”103 If the authors are as hostile to contractual
provisions that shape the Chapter 11 voting and confirmation process as
their call for a pristine process seems to suggest, their approach would
bar a wide range of potentially beneficial contracts—not just many RSAs,
but also intercreditor agreements (which often limit second lien creditors’
ability to object to a proposed reorganization plan) and other contracts.
In my view, a more nuanced approach is far preferable.
Although they would severely restrict RSAs, these scholars do
acknowledge that the risk of holdouts is particularly serious in current
practice.104 Rather than permitting signing bonuses where they serve to
discipline potentially problematic holdouts, these scholars would limit
the voting rights of creditors who buy claims to the amount they paid for
the claim, and would also limit a creditor’s voting rights to the creditor’s
true economic interest in the claims they are voting.105 Although their
proposals are intriguing, in my view they are a poor fit for the holdout
problems that signing fees often address. Creditors who acquire their
claims after the onset of financial distress are not always the creditors that
strategically hold out, for instance. The reforms also would significantly
complicate the voting process,106 undermine the liquidity of the claims
trading markets,107 and unfairly punish those who acquired the claims. To
the extent the prohibition on RSAs with signing fees and other distortive
techniques made it more difficult to negotiate and confirm a
reorganization plan, their hostility to these techniques also could have the
ironic effect of leading to more § 363 sales, which lack many of the
protections provided by the Chapter 11 voting process.
Another scholar has recently critiqued Triantis’s and my analysis of
the new contract paradigm from a different perspective, arguing that it
Badges of Opportunism, supra note 100, at 186 (calling payments to signatories a “badge of
opportunism”).
103. Proceduralist Inversion, supra note 100, at 344.
104. See, e.g., id. at 346 (stating that the “injunction to look at the structure of the business
and the liquidity of the claims trading market [to assess the likelihood of holdout behavior] is
perhaps Skeel’s most useful insight”).
105. Id. at 351. Janger and Levitin first advocated these proposals in an earlier article. See
Edward J. Janger & Adam J. Levitin, One Dollar, One Vote: Mark-to-Market Governance in
Bankruptcy, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1857, 1861 (2019).
106. See Janger & Levitin, supra note 105, at 1876–77 (discussing the voting process). The
court would need to determine the amounts paid by every claimant who acquired her claim
after distress and incorporate this into the voting calculations. See id.
107. See Janger & Levitin, supra note 105, at 1886. Professors Janger and Levitin would
only limit claims traders’ voting rights, not their economic rights to a payout. See id. As a
result, the chilling effect on claims trading would be less dramatic than it would be if all of
their rights were limited, as Janger and Levitin note in their earlier article. Id. But the chilling
effect would not disappear.
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gives too much deference to ex ante contracts. 108 The critique is part of a
more general argument that the purpose of bankruptcy is to minimize the
holdup behavior that might otherwise undermine the ex post
renegotiation of a debtor’s obligations in the event of financial distress.109
Ex post contracting is given priority under this perspective, which
advocates “cramdown for everything.”110
Although the analysis is fascinating and compelling at times, it has
two crucial limitations, in my view. 111 First, privileging ex post
contracting, and treating existing obligations as expendable, undermines
the benefits of ex ante contracting discussed earlier. 112 It raises
uncertainty whether allocations of risk will be honored, and diminishes
the parties’ incentives to make relationship specific investments. 113 It also
could increase overall transaction costs, since contractual arrangements
that would otherwise be settled are reopened for possible negotiation.114
Second, this bias for ex post renegotiation—“cramdown for
everything”—magnifies the need for bankruptcy judges to exercise
judicial discretion.115 For many years, bankruptcy practitioners avoided
the use of the cramdown provision for precisely this reason—that it
108. See Casey, supra note 27, at 1751 n.220 (criticizing our approach as “plac[ing] more
trust in ex ante contracting than Chapter 11 does.”).
109. See id. at 1715. Professor Casey conceptualizes bankruptcy as a response to the
inevitable incompleteness of contracts made while the debtor is financially healthy. See id.
He suggests that a risk of holdup arises in the event of financial distress as a result of the
parties’ relationship specific investments, as conceptualized in the contracts literature. See id.
(citing Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56
ECONOMETRICA 755, 757 (1988)). But Casey goes on to deploy the term “holdup” far more
broadly than this, using it as a catch-all that seems to encompass any behavior by a party that
jeopardizes a firm’s going concern value. See id. at 1717 (stating that “the potential for holdup arises when parties have made investments that involve or link in some way to the goingconcern value of the debtor”).
110. Id. at 1753.
111. I also quibble with several of the applications of the analysis, such as its defense of
the current treatment of executory contracts, despite the well-known distortions caused by §
365 and its defense of the controversial case, Precision Indus., Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ,
LLC., 327 F.3d 357, 548 (7th Cir. 2003). See Casey, supra note 27, at 1757, 1764–65 n.255
(citing and disagreeing with David Skeel, Jr., The Empty Idea of “Equality of Creditors”, 166
U. PA. L. R. 699, 721–22 (2018)).
112. See Skeel & Triantis, supra note 21, at 1782–83. The Chapter 11 confirmation rules
themselves provide the framework for an ex post contract, as Professor Triantis and I pointed
out in the earlier article. See id. at 1784–85. But courts’ hostility to ex ante contracting goes
well beyond the Code itself. See id. at 1785.
113. See id. at 1816. Professor Casey’s approach, which focuses on holdup in relational
contexts, could thus undermine relational investment. See Casey, supra note 27, at 1711.
114. See Skeel & Triantis, supra note 21, at 1816.
115. See In re LMR, LLC, 496 N.R. 410, 428 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2013) (discussing the
discretion given to judges in determining the cramdown interest methodology).
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required a determination of the value of the firm and as a result put
significant discretion in the hands of the bankruptcy judge.116 The more
contexts in which a cramdown style approach is implemented, the more
judicial discretion is required. Chapter 11 works best when judicial
discretion is cabined rather than magnified, in my view.117
Rather than privileging ex post renegotiation, the better approach in
my view is to balance the costs and benefits of ex ante and ex post
contracts.
II. TWO TROUBLE SPOTS
In the process of identifying and offering a normative defense of the
new contract paradigm, I briefly considered its implications for a variety
of key bankruptcy-related contracts, including intercreditor agreements,
RSAs, and bankruptcy remote entities. In this part, I focus in somewhat
more detail on additional contractual issues that have provoked
increasing controversy, the treatment of DIP financers and other senior
lenders, and managerial bonuses arranged shortly before or during
bankruptcy. Each is one of the first contracts that were used to shape
Chapter 11 cases roughly twenty-five years ago when the contract
paradigm first began to emerge. 118 I consider them in turn.
A. DIP Financers and Other Senior Lenders
The DIP financing provision is an extremely generous grant of
authority to the bankruptcy judge to approve loans to the debtor.119
Debtors generally arrange the financing prior to filing for bankruptcy, and
ask the bankruptcy judge to approve it immediately after the filing, as
part of the debtor’s “first day orders.”120 Seventy-five percent of the time,
the new lender is the same as the debtor’s old lender. 121 The DIP

116. See Charles D. Booth, The Cramdown on Secured Creditors: An Impetus Toward
Settlement, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 69, 94 (1986).
117. Casey appears to acknowledge this problem, noting that the need for the court “to
value the relevant assets, claims and outcomes . . . may be the Achilles heel” of this approach.
See Casey, supra note 27, at 1769.
118. See Skeel, supra note 81, at 923–30.
119. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2021) (discussing when the court may authorize
obtaining credit or incurring debt). As discussed below, the most dramatic power, in § 364(d),
is the court’s authority to grant a “priming lien” giving the DIP financing priority even over
earlier liens. Id. § 364(d).
120. The U.S. Trustee’s Role in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (last
updated Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/ust/bankruptcy-fact-sheets/us-trustees-rolechapter-11-bankruptcy-cases.
121. See also Frederick Tung, Financing Failure: Bankruptcy Lending, Credit Market
Conditions, and the Financial Crisis, 37 YALE J. REG. 651, 655 n.13 (2020).
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financing agreement generally includes “milestones” that the debtor is
required to meet.122 The milestones may contemplate a sale of the
debtor’s assets or significantly limit the time for filing a reorganization
plan.123 The DIP financing agreement, together with the lender’s lien on
most or all of the debtor’s assets, often gives the DIP financer control of
the case.124
The dominance of secured creditors—especially DIP financers—
has been quite controversial for some time.125 Although the complaints
often blur together, there are two, conceptually different critiques of
senior lenders in bankruptcy. The first is a critique of the treatment of
senior lenders’ prebankruptcy claims, and applies to all senior lenders,
whether or not they also are DIP financers. According to this criticism,
the prebankruptcy lender should not be entitled to all of the proceeds of
a sale or other disposition of the debtor’s assets, even if the lender
purports to have a “blanket” lien. These scholars contend that the
lender’s ex ante lien does not126 or should not encumber all of the value
of the debtor.127 The ABI Report adopted a version of these proposals,
calling for unsecured creditors to receive the option value of their claims
in either an asset sale or a traditional reorganization.128
The second criticism, by contrast, is a concern about ex post
contracts—the DIP financing agreements a debtor enters into after having
fallen into financial distress. Critics characterize the market for financing

122. See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & Jared A. Ellias, Bankruptcy Process for Sale, 29 YALE J.
REG. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 15), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3611350 (finding that
86% of DIP financing agreements in recent study included milestones).
123. The DIP financing agreement often is coupled with an RSA. See, e.g., id. (manuscript
at 2–3) (describing DIP financing and RSA).
124. Julian S.H. Chung & Gary L. Kaplan, An Overview of Debtor in Possession Financing,
in INT’L COMPAR. LEG. GUIDES: LENDING & SECURED FIN. 2020 120, 121 (Global Legal Group
Ltd., 2020).
125. An early cri de coeur is Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Secured Party in
Possession, 22-7 ABI JNL. LEXIS 12, 12 (2003).
126. Ted Janger has been the strongest proponent of the view that the scope of secured
creditors’ lien is limited even under existing law. See Edward J. Janger, The Logic and Limits
of Liens, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 589, 589 (2015).
127. Anthony Casey argues that unsecured creditors should retain the option value of their
claims even after a debtor files for bankruptcy; and that secured creditors’ recovery should be
adjusted based on this option. Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and OptionPreservation Priority in Chapter 11, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 765 (2011). Melissa Jacoby and
Ted Janger propose that funds be set aside to compensate unsecured claims in the event a
bankruptcy sale later appeared to have garnered too low a price. Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward
J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123
YALE L.J. 862, 862 (2014).
128. See BAKER, supra note 5, at 207–11.
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as uncompetitive. They also worry that DIP financers have too much
control of the case, and that this can have problematic consequences.
The analysis of ex ante and ex post incentives in the last part
suggests that the policy recommendations emanating from the first
critique—the calls to limit senior creditors’ liens— would be a mistake.
If senior lenders have a lien on all of the debtor’s assets, they should be
treated as having priority with respect to all of the value. 129 Artificially
limiting the scope of a lender’s security interest would undermine the ex
ante benefits of collateralized lending.130
The second critique—which focuses on ex post contracts— is more
serious. Evidence has recently emerged that DIP financers earn supracompetitive profits from DIP loans.131 One study measured the profits
directly, and concluded that DIP lenders’ supra-competitive profits have
not declined through time.132 Another found that the pricing of DIP loans
is comparable to junk bonds, despite the much lower default rate on DIP
loans.133 The most likely explanation for persistently supra-competitive
profits is the advantage a debtor’s existing lenders have over other
potential sources of funding.134 The debtor’s prebankruptcy lenders have
much more information about the debtor than other lenders, and are often
well positioned to quickly provide the operating funds the debtor
needs.135 As noted earlier, 80% of debtors that obtain DIP financing get
the financing from inside lenders.136 In response to this evidence, some
scholars have suggested that courts or lawmakers should intervene in the
DIP financing market.
The persistence of supra-competitive profits suggests the market for
DIP financing may not be working efficiently. A variety of harms may
flow from this. The most obvious is that debtors will be forced to pay
more for DIP financing than they would in a competitive market. 137 DIP
129. For a similar conclusion, see Douglas G. Baird, The Rights of Secured Creditors After
Res Cap, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 849, 857–58 (2015) (“As long as a creditor has a senior security
interest in everything at the moment the petition was filed, any increase in value during the
bankruptcy belongs to this creditor.”).
130. For a similar argument, see Barry E. Adler & George Triantis, Debt Priority and
Options in Bankruptcy: A Policy Intervention, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 563, 591 (2017)
(criticizing the ABI proposal).
131. See B. Espen Eckbo, Kai Li & Wei Wang, Rent Extraction by Super-Priority Lenders
5 (Tuck Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 3384389, 2019); see also Tung, supra note 121, at
653.
132. See Eckbo et al, supra note 131, at 10.
133. See Tung, supra note 121, at 686–87.
134. See Eckbo et al, supra note 131, at 3–4.
135. See id. at 7.
136. Id. at 4; see also Tung, supra note 121, at 658.
137. See Tung, supra note 121, at 657.
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lenders also may use their leverage to insist on benefits that improve their
position at the expense of other creditors.138 Finally, the DIP lender could
dictate an outcome that benefits the DIP lender but diminishes the overall
value of the firm.139 Rather than allow the debtor to pursue a traditional
reorganization, for instance, the DIP lender may condition its loan on a
prompt sale of the debtor’s assets, even if reorganization would be more
efficient.140
It is important to recognize that DIP lender control can also be
beneficial. Before lenders began using DIP financing agreements as a
governance lever, the debtor’s managers often had too much flexibility,
and cases sometimes dragged on for considerable periods of time.141
Neither problem is nearly as prevalent today. 142
Bankruptcy judges face a difficult predicament when they scrutinize
proposed DIP lending agreements. The debtor and the inside lender often
warn that, unless the court approves the loan, the business will collapse
in short order.143 In theory, bankruptcy judges could scrutinize the terms
of the loan contract and forbid those that seem problematic. To some
extent, they already do this by requiring clear identification of potentially
problematic DIP loan provisions.144 But it is unrealistic to expect judges
to micromanage the contracts.
One strategy that might help is to signal a willingness to grant a
priming lien to a non-insider that offers to make a loan.145 Courts have
been very reluctant to authorize a priming lien for a non-insider lender
138. See id. at 654. One common strategy—known as a “roll-up”—is to insist that the
debtor pay off the earlier loan with proceeds of the DIP loan, which ensures that the earlier
loan is paid in full even if it was not actually fully collateralized. See id. The DIP financer
may also ask the debtor to waive causes of action the debtor may have against the DIP
financer. Id. at 667–68.
139. See Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in
Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 514 (2009).
140. See id. at 529–30.
141. See Foteini Teloni, Chapter 11 Duration, Pre-Planned Cases, and Refiling Rates: An
Empirical Analysis in the Post-BAPCPA Era, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 571, 580–81
(2015).
142. Id. at 593 (finding that the mean duration for traditional Chapter 11 cases dropped
from 634 to 430 days after 2005, and the mean for all cases, including prepackaged
bankruptcies, fell from 480 to 261 days).
143. See Tung, supra note 121, at 665.
144. The bankruptcy judges in the Southern District of New York have guidelines requiring
proponents of DIP loans to explicitly flag, among other things, any provision using new
collateral to collateralize pre-petition obligations. See S.D.N.Y. U.S.B.C. L.B.R. 4001-2(a)(6)
(2020).
145. Ayotte and Ellias advocate a more aggressive approach, proposing that courts provide
a two-three month period for a priming loan at the beginning of the case. See Ayotte & Ellias,
supra note 122, at 9.
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unless the earlier lender consents. 146 Yet the Code explicitly authorizes
courts to approve priming liens so long as the prior lender’s loan is
adequately protected.147
Notice that adopting a more flexible stance toward priming liens
would not require any legislative reform. If bankruptcy judges simply
signaled a willingness to grant priming liens, and did in fact grant them
in appropriate cases, the market might become more competitive. 148 This
step seems more promising than a more dramatic intrusion into the
market.
B. Managerial Bonuses
The other early ex post contractual strategy for shaping managers’
behavior was the use of performance bonuses.149 These bonuses might
promise the managers a bigger payout if a reorganization plan was
confirmed within a specified period of time, or the payout might be linked
to the value of the debtor’s assets at confirmation. More recently,
companies have increasingly begun paying bonuses to their executives
before filing for bankruptcy rather than after, a trend that is quite
controversial.150 “Such bonuses have long spurred objections,” as one
story put it, “that companies are enriching executives while cutting jobs,
stiffing creditors and wiping out stock investors.”151
Ironically, the rush to award bonuses prior to bankruptcy seems to
have been prompted by changes made to the Bankruptcy Code in 2005,
after scandals involving Enron, WorldCom, and other companies
prompted amendments designed to discourage bonuses in bankruptcy.152
The 2005 amendments essentially ban post-petition pay-to-stay bonuses,
forbidding them unless, among other things, the executive has a bona fide

146. See Tung, supra note 121, at 658 n.25; see also 11 U.S.C. § 364(d)(1)(B) (2021).
147. See § 364(c)–(d).
148. In another work, a co-author and I suggest another non-legislative corrective: banking
regulators could facilitate DIP lending by ordinary banks to medium-sized firms, which
currently have little access to DIP loans. See Peter Conti-Brown & David Skeel, Using the
Federal Reserve’s Discount Window for Debtor-in-Possession Financing During the COVID19 Bankruptcy Crisis, BROOKINGS INST. 3 (2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/07/Conti-Brown-Skeel.pdf.
149. See Skeel, supra note 70 at 926–30.
150. See, e.g., Mike Spector & Jessica DiNapoli, On Eve of Bankruptcy, U.S. Firms Shower
Execs with Bonuses, REUTERS (July 17, 2020, 7:05 A.M.) https://www.reuters.com/article/ushealth-coronavirus-bankruptcy-bonuses/on-eve-of-bankruptcy-u-s-firms-shower-execs-withbonuses-idUSKCN24I1EE.
151. Id.
152. See Jared Ellias, Regulating Bankruptcy Bonuses, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 654, 654–55
(2019).
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offer from another employer at the same or greater compensation.153
Because the prohibition only applies to stay bonuses, debtors can evade
it by making sure the bonuses have performance-based features. But the
changes seem to have prompted frequent challenges to the bonus plans.154
The new prebankruptcy bonuses are not immune from attack
altogether. They can be challenged as fraudulent conveyances—based on
the argument that the company received insufficient consideration in
return for the payout.155 But the debtor is not likely to challenge the
bonuses, since its managers or directors are the ones who authorized the
bonuses in the first place; thus, the creditors’ committee would need to
obtain court approval to challenge the bonus.156 In many cases, the
bonuses are never formally challenged, and in the end any claims against
the executives are released as part of the Chapter 11 reorganization
plan.157
A proposal to ban all post-petition bonuses was recently introduced
in Congress.158 The proposed legislation would prohibit a debtor from
paying bonuses to any employee making more than $250,000 a year, and
covers bonuses of all kinds, defining “bonus” to include any
compensation that “can be construed as a form of retention, incentive, or
reward related to the services provided to the debtor.”159
Awarding bonuses to managers after a company has fallen into
financial distress is analogous to resetting executives’ stock options after
a decline in the firm’s stock price. From an efficiency perspective, the
problem with an option reset is that it undermines executives’ ex ante
incentives—suggesting they will be given another opportunity to benefit
even if the firm performs poorly.160 But the reset also can improve the
executives’ ex post incentives by, for instance, linking the bonus to

153. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(c) (2021).
154. In an extensive empirical study of bankruptcy bonuses, Professor Jared Ellias finds
that § 503(c) is easily evaded, but the bonuses are often contested and seem to be used
somewhat less frequently than before BAPCA. See Ellias, supra note 152, at 664–65.
155. See id. at 660 n.21 (citing James Sprayregen et al., Recent Lessons on Management
Compensation at Various Stages of the Chapter 11 Process, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Mar.
2013), https://www.financierworldwide.com/recent-lessons-on-mangement-compensationat-various-stages-of-the-chapter-11-process/#.XEZb6S3Myu4).
156. See id. at 681–82; see also M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy:
Executive Compensation When Agency Costs Are Low, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1543, 1581
(2007).
157. See Henderson, supra note 156, at 1575.
158. No Bonuses in Bankruptcy Act of 2019, H.R. 1557, 116th Cong. (2019).
159. Id. § 2 (proposing for codification at § 503(d)(2)(B)).
160. See, e.g. Viral V. Acharya et al., On the Optimality of Resetting Stock Options, 57 J.
FIN. ECON. 63, 67–68 (2000).
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performance milestones.161 The challenge, as always, is to approximate
the optimal balance between ex ante and ex post incentives.162
The same logic suggests that a complete ban on bonuses would be a
mistake, given the possibility they will improve managers’ incentives in
bankruptcy. To be sure, this by itself does not mean proposals to preclude
post-petition bonuses are problematic. If bonuses are best arranged prior
to bankruptcy rather than during the bankruptcy case, perhaps such a ban
could be justified. But precisely the opposite is true. 163 The risk of selfdealing is much more severe if the bonus is given prior to bankruptcy.
Arranging bonuses post-petition ensures more transparency, given the
requirement of notice and a hearing as a prerequisite for approval. 164
Moreover, prebankruptcy bonuses can more easily be used to help cement
the control of inside lenders. Pre-bankruptcy bonuses should therefore
be viewed with more skepticism than post-petition bonuses, not less.
These considerations not only weigh against adopting a ban on
bankruptcy bonuses; they also suggest that the current restrictions on
post-petition bonuses should be rolled back, given the evidence that the
existing restrictions on post-petition stay bonuses have spurred more
challenges to performance-based bonuses.
Either approach—the current rule or a rule that removed the 2005
restriction on stay bonuses—requires a bankruptcy judge to police the
bargain with imperfect information, as with other ex post contracts.165
This may counsel in favor of adopting rules of thumb, such as a
presumption against ever permitting pre-bankruptcy bonuses and closer
scrutiny of stay bonuses than true performance bonuses that are proposed
after the debtor files for bankruptcy.
Courts employ a similar strategy in corporate law. In determining
whether to enforce lockup or breakup fee provisions that promise
compensation to a bidder if the bidder’s acquisition of a target company
is not successful, for instance, courts have developed rough guidelines for

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Even if pre-bankruptcy bonus awards were preferable, the proposed legislation would
effectively bar performance-based bonuses entered into before bankruptcy, since the
performance would occur during the bankruptcy case and the legislation bars any bonus
payment during the case. Only pre-bankruptcy stay bonuses that were paid prior to filing
would escape the ban.
164. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2021) (requiring court approval of transactions out of the ordinary
course of business).
165. For a similar point, see Barry Adler & George G. Triantis, The Aftermath of North
LaSalle Street, 70 U. CINN. L. REV. 1225, 1237 (2002) (concluding that judges are not wellpositioned to balance the ex ante and ex post incentives).
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permissible provisions, while striking down lockups that are clearly
excessive.166
CONCLUSION
Although the statutory framework of Chapter 11 has not changed
dramatically for more than forty years now—the interval at which major
reforms had previously arrived over the past century167—bankruptcy
practice has. I have referred to the regime that has emerged as
bankruptcy’s new contract paradigm. I have argued that the key focus of
oversight should be trading off the benefits and costs of ex ante and ex
post contracts and have advocated that bankruptcy judges give a little less
deference to ex post contracts, and a little more to ex ante arrangements.
Just as bankruptcy practice is dynamic, judicial oversight of
bankruptcy-relevant contracts also needs to be dynamic. Twenty-five
years ago, some of the contracts that are most central to current Chapter
11 practice, such as intercreditor agreements and RSAs, were uncommon.
Other contracts, such as DIP financing agreements have evolved in ways
that are more problematic than they were in earlier periods.
The Bankruptcy Code has had a splendid run, and it has proven more
adaptable than anyone imagined four decades ago. Sam Gerdano has
been there pretty much from the beginning, and his fingerprints are
everywhere in present American bankruptcy law, in ways both visible
and invisible. It has been a privilege to watch him in action, and it is a
privilege to call him a friend.

166. Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp. is the leading case on breakup fees, suggesting that fees
up to three to four percent of the value of a deal will generally be permitted. See 695 A.2d 43,
49, 50 (Del. 1997). In both Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. and
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court struck
down lockups as excessive. See 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986); see also 637 A.2d 34, 51
(Del. 1994).
167. Congress enacted pervasive bankruptcy reform in 1898, 1938 and 1978. See
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (Nelson Act), Pub. L. No. 55-541, 30 Stat. 544; see also Bankruptcy
Act of 1938 (Chandler Act), Pub. L. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840; see also Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C.).

